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To thrive in 2020, we must conceive of the ﬁeld of
public administration in the broadest possible terms.
Phenomena that typically have been treated peripherally
in our literature are emerging center stage in recent years,
conﬁrming that the “old” boundaries of our discipline do
not reﬂect contemporary reality. After reviewing three key
developments—the rise of mixed and nongovernmental
institutions in public policy, the increasing importance
of market mechanisms, and the assertion of meaningful
global regulation—an argument is made for a broader
reconception of “publicness” that goes hand in hand with
the embrace of governance in lieu of administration.

T

crisis and the remarkable events of the last several
years, coming on top of waves of reform and innovation, suggest that remaining within existing disciplinary borders risks marginalization of our ﬁeld. Only by
forcefully resisting the academic tendency to burrow ever deeper within disciplinary conﬁnes can we
maintain our vitality. The emerging world of public
administration without borders requires a signiﬁcant
reorientation.
In this brief essay, I will highlight three ascendant institutional forms and practices that transcend
boundaries that traditionally deﬁne the study of public administration. This list is not comprehensive, nor
should this essay be read as an indictment of our ﬁeld
for “missing” these developments. All of the topics
have been looked at by scholars of public administration (and other disciplines), but because they are not
easily accommodated within our existing bins, they
have not been embraced as core issues in our ﬁeld.

he most formidable enclosures are those that
go unrecognized, creating a conﬁnement so
profound that those entrapped are unaware
of the boundary. In the movie The Truman Show, Jim
Carrey’s character is the subject of a “reality” television
show, living his entire life within an elaborate soundstage. He exists in this state of ignorance, with his every
move providing entertainment for the viewers at home,
• First, organizations that mix characteristics of
until a sequence of developments reveals the very
governmental and nongovernmental entities now
real limits of his world. Alerted to his containment,
play a central role in the delivery of public goods
he is driven to break out of this bubble, overcoming
and services in almost every policy arena.
obstacles thrown in his path by the show’s producer,
• Second, market mechanisms
who suggests that the neatness
in the regulation and allocaof Truman’s artiﬁcially circumtion of scarce resources seem to
scribed world is preferable to the
The adventures of Dwight
be favored in numerous policy
chaos beyond its limits.
Waldo and his acolytes are
areas.
not (yet) the stuﬀ of reality
The adventures of Dwight
• Third, cross-border cooperatelevision, but as public
Waldo and his acolytes are not
tion and, in some cases, reliance
administration scholars we now on institutions that span nation(yet) the stuﬀ of reality television, but as public adminisﬁnd ourselves similarly conﬁned states is an increasingly comtration scholars we now ﬁnd
mon response to transnational
by boundaries that have arisen
ourselves similarly conﬁned
public policy challenges.
around our ﬁeld over the last
by boundaries that have arisen
hundred years. To remain
around our ﬁeld over the last
Each of these developments
relevant
in 2020, we must step
hundred years. To remain
is considered before turning
beyond the lines that deﬁne
relevant in 2020, we must step
to a discussion of the changes
beyond the lines that deﬁne our
required in our collective mindour ﬁeld but do not reﬂect
ﬁeld but do not reﬂect contemset to push these matters to the
contemporary realities.
forefront. Essentially, I argue that
porary realities. The ﬁnancial
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in order to maintain and even increase relevance in 2020, we must
revise our understanding of both “public” and “administration” to
better match emerging practices. This means rejecting the equation of
“public” with “governmental” and instead taking in the full panoply of
programs and institutions that create and protect public goods, regardless of organizational sector. It also means expanding our understanding of “administration” to include market-based programs that eschew
the state production and distribution of public goods and services that
once deﬁned government bureaucracy. Indeed, “governance in the
public interest” might be a better moniker for our ﬁeld than “public
administration.” Finally, the pressures of academic specialization that
keep international organizations oﬀ the radar screen of those interested
in bureaucracy and administration must be overcome.
In his Spirit of Public Administration (1997), H. George Frederickson considered the meaning of “public” and “administration”
and expressed reservations about the expansion of these terms. He
persuasively argued that the transmogriﬁcation of public administration into “governance” would move our ﬁeld away from the very
real matters of managing complex organizations and implementing
public policy. But even in the 13 years since that book was published, the practice of public administration has spilled over the
boundaries of our discipline. “Public policies” are not exclusively
implemented by government agencies wielding traditional tools. In
shaping the meaning of public administration, we should favor the
empirical over the theoretical.
Organizations Mixing Sectors
From its origins in the writings of ancient philosophers and our
spiritual godfather Niccolò Machiavelli to our more proximate
founder Woodrow Wilson, public administration has been taken
to refer to the theory and practice of government. The view is fairly
universal; scholars around the world have pursued work that hews
to the public administration as government line. This approach was
understandable in the past, but it now feels artiﬁcial. The last few
decades have seen reliance on a wide variety of institutions to deliver
public policy (O’Leary, Gerard, and Bingham 2006; Seidman 1988;
Seidman and Gilmour 1986). Pushed by changes in budget rules,
ﬁscal constraints, and a belief that market instruments are more
eﬀectively wielded by institutions designed to function in the marketplace, there has been a proliferation of public–private hybrids,
partnerships between governmental and nongovernmental entities,
and other nontraditional approaches to public management (Kettl
2006). In the last two years, we have even witnessed an unanticipated American revival of a diﬀerent variation on quasi-government,
government ownership of for-proﬁt enterprises.
None of this is new—either as a phenomenon or as a subject in
public administration discourse. Public authorities predate the
United States as mechanisms for the delivery of collective goods
that endow entities outside the formal government bureaucracy
with pseudo-governmental powers (Doig 2001; Walsh 1978). In
the United States, public authorities—and their cousins, special
districts and other municipal corporations—are familiar parts of
the local governance landscape (Foster 1997; Leigland 1994). The
modern era of federal experimentation began during World War I,
during which there was a population boom of government corporations to facilitate wartime production. Although these entities were
dissolved following the Great War, the government corporations

created as part of the New Deal persisted (Koppell 2003; Stanton
2002). Indeed, the institutional form proved useful, and government corporations proliferated and evolved in response to changing
conditions (Moe 1983).
Government corporations introduce a diﬀerent logic into the
administrative equation by virtue of their reliance on fee-based
revenue generation to cover costs.1 Admittedly, most government
corporations are not formally limited by their income; their budgets
are not literally constrained by revenues, but managers of government corporations must shape activities with the goal of breaking
even (Koppell 2003). And so the delegation of public policy responsibilities in a variety of areas—housing, power generation, uranium
disposal, agriculture—often operates under a diﬀerent dynamic
than “normal” administration, which requires operation within an
appropriation not linked to agency revenue. If recent history is an
accurate guide, the linkage between programmatic revenue and budget is likely to be stronger by 2020, a development that shapes the
politics of policy in which that connection is drawn (e.g., highway
funding, national parks) and those in which it is not.
Mutations of the basic government corporation have spread across
the governmental landscape. The federal government now boasts a
fairly extensive lineup of venture capital funds, for example. Inspired
in part by the Small Business Administration’s Small Business
Investment Company program, which oﬀers ﬁnancial assistance
to privately run funds that direct capital to smaller ﬁrms, both the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the U.S. Agency for
International Development oversaw portfolios of government venture capital funds (Koppel 1999). The Central Intelligence Agency’s
In-Q-Tel, a technology fund named after the gadget wizard from the
James Bond ﬁlms, prompted the U.S. Army to start its own fund,
OnPoint Technologies (Rottenberg 2006). Similar programs have
proliferated at the state and local level (Lerner 2009).
The quirkiness, obscurity, and peculiar names associated with these
and other organizations that break the mold of government bureaucracies have kept the study of quasi-government out of mainstream
public administration studies. But the centrality in the ﬁnancial
crisis of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs) that originated as government corporations,
underscores the need to pay more attention to institutions that do
not ﬁt into the typical categories of bureaucratic study. For one
thing, the eﬀects of the Fannie and Freddie collapse will be farreaching. As Congress wrestles with the future of these two companies, other quasi-governmental entities such as the Federal Home
Loan Bank system (which also plays a central role in the U.S. housing ﬁnance system and is even more obscure to students of American government than the GSEs) will be drawn into the discussion
(Hoﬀmann and Cassell 2002).
Moreover, the activities of quasi-governmental organizations cannot
be detached from “normal” government. Not only will the ﬁnancial
implications of the GSEs’ collapse still be felt in 2020, their restructuring has put the entire federal approach to housing and ﬁnancial
regulation on the table as well. Most fundamentally, the Fannie
and Freddie debacle calls into question the ability of bureaucrats to
eﬀectively administer government participation in markets. Policies
that that harness the creditworthiness of the U.S. government are
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immensely appealing on paper, but the administration challenges
cannot be overlooked when confronted with events of the last two
years. The regulatory administration was clearly overwhelmed, but
the problem runs deeper. In the midst of a mortgage credit crisis,
members of Congress used Fannie and Freddie to stimulate or sustain markets even as the condition of their balance sheets was going
from bad to catastrophic. Senators suggested lowering the GSEs’
capital requirements even as the federal government put billions on
the line to cover company losses to keep propping up house prices
(Duhigg 2008). One cannot understand such developments—and
the administrative challenge for government oﬃcials working in this
area—without a strong understanding of the business logic driving
the institutions at the heart of this policy arena.
Our collective comfort with the incongruity of government sponsorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac now seems fairly quaint. As
publicly traded companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
the GSEs unambiguously owe a proﬁtable return to their shareholders even as they meet regulatory demands for ﬁscal safety and attainment of public policy goals (Koppell 2003). The companies are now
eﬀectively government agencies, maintaining a shareholder structure mostly as a means of keeping their liabilities oﬀ-budget. The
spectacle of ﬁrms with no implicit government guarantee receiving
bailouts in 2008 and 2009 actually eclipsed this development. With
the federal government now the dominant shareholder in General
Motors, AIG, Chrysler, and Citigroup, the problem of murkiness
in corporate objectives is more widespread; claims that maximizing
shareholder value is the unchallenged corporate purpose for these
American state-owned enterprises are undermined by the thorny
reality of government oﬃcials seeking to impose policy objectives
(e.g., saving dealerships from elimination) (King 2009). Similarly,
ﬁnancial institutions that accepted Troubled Asset Relief Program
funds are assailed for their practices—from nonlending to executive
compensation—with the linkage between dissatisfaction and their
receipt of government largesse quite explicit.
Public administration scholars must confront such developments
head on, and they must not be deterred by the “business-y” aspects of
quasi-government. Corporations in which the public has a material
interest must be an integral part of our disciplinary territory. Leaving
such institutions to be studied by scholars from other ﬁelds is more
than an interdisciplinary turf concession, it is an ideological choice
with policy consequences. To leave analysis of the corporations owned
wholly or in part by the federal government, or those receiving billions in taxpayer funded bailouts, to economists, ﬁnance professors,
and scholars from ﬁelds other than public administration is to deny
the “publicness” of this phenomenon. By examining these newly created creatures as subjects of public administration inquiry, however,
we can (and should) make clear that steps taken with respect to these
entities must be examined in more than mere economic or ﬁnancial
terms. Indeed, extending the umbrella of public administration to
cover such entities—and explicating the administrative complexities of such arrangements—may reduce the likelihood of Uncle Sam
holding equity in these ﬁrms 10 years from now.
There are both policy and administration dimensions to these developments. The former receives more attention, but the latter is of
primary interest here. Government-sponsored enterprises and other
mixed institutions introduce distinctive imperatives and constraints
S48 Public Administration Review • December 2010 • Special Issue

for government oﬃcials, inside and around these organizations.
Consider another class of sector-spanning institutions that has
received attention in recent years: sovereign wealth funds. These are
vast accumulations of capital, often accrued from the sale of natural
resources, controlled by governments. Most attention has gone to
the funds associated with petrostates such as Russia, Kuwait, United
Arab Emirates, and Norway, but there are others with wealth that
is not derived from oil and gas sales (e.g., China, Singapore). And
there are massive funds controlled by subnational governments,
including American entities such as the Alaska Permanent Fund,
and various state pension funds, most notably Calpers.
Each of these entities oﬀers a formidable public administration challenge as the leaders and staﬀ of these organizations—some government employees and some retained management ﬁrms—seek to
balance revenue maximization, risk management, and other policy
considerations in portfolio management (Kimmitt 2008). Recently,
attention has been focused on the estimates of returns oﬀered by pension fund managers. Slight changes in these estimates have profound
budgetary implications for the states and municipalities that rely on
these entities to meet their obligations to retired employees (Walsh
2010). So the decision to rely on hybrid organizations raises myriad
novel policy questions, but the successful implementation of such an
approach requires an equally profound reevaluation of administrative assumptions (Justice and Miller 2010). Scholars focused on the
administrative issues raised by hybrid government can make a valuable contribution to policy debates by highlighting the implementation pitfalls that are often unconsidered in the policy-making process.
The mixing of sectors is hardly limited to government and for-proﬁt
ﬁrms; the thickening of ties between government and nonproﬁt organizations is also undermining the public administration as government syllogism. Nonproﬁts are now vital instruments of public policy
in a host of domains (Clerkin and Grønbjerg 2007). They receive
favorable tax treatment and direct grants, of course, and also are
engaged as contractors for federal, state, and local agencies (Dionne
and Chen 2001). This trend seems to transcend partisan dividing
lines (White 2009). President Barack Obama kept in place the Oﬃce
of Faith-Based Initiatives established in the White House by George
W. Bush, a particular species of collaboration that may have been
seen as endangered under a Democratic administration (Allard 2009).
Schools of public administration have generally embraced students
who aspire to manage nonproﬁt organizations, reﬂecting the need
to oﬀer an attractive product to potential master’s students in an
environment that has seen declining interest in government employment. The ﬁeld of public administration should remain synchronized with this curricular demand, or scholars may ﬁnd themselves
out of place in the very schools that are our home. Again, I am not
suggesting that this is not happening. In education, health, housing, and other areas, public administration scholars have looked at
nonproﬁts, but this remains a secondary topic in our ﬁeld.
Treating boundary-spanning organizations—both familiar and
novel—as core subjects of public administration scholarship is
important for another reason. One might argue that although these
types of organizations are instruments or consequences of government policy, they are at the margins of our discipline’s traditional
focus. But the eﬀects of introducing these creatures into the

environment are felt in every traditional area of
administration research, placing new demands
on government bureaucracies and processes.

the future of our ﬁeld. First, we have more
and more institutions that do not look like
traditional government agencies. We should
resist our collective tendency to treat these
novel arrangements as sui generis deviations
from a norm. The public–private hybrid is the
contemporary norm, and thus the eﬀective
administration of such entities should be a
central concern and one that informs, and is
informed by, mainstream public administration discourse. Second, increased reliance
on organizations that blur the lines between
public and private alters the burden on traditional government bureaucracies. Many of the
core processes in which public administration
is interested—from personnel to procurement
to budgeting—are upset by the introduction
of these new bureaucratic beasts. And new
responsibilities, discussed more in the next
section, increase the emphasis on skills (predicting markets, assessing risks) that have never been bureaucratic strengths.

The proliferation of entities that
span public and private
sectors . . . has ﬁrst- and
second-order eﬀects that ought
to inﬂuence the future of our
ﬁeld. First, we have more and
more institutions that do not
look like traditional government
agencies. . . . Second, increased
reliance on organizations that
blur the lines between public
and private alters the burden
on traditional government
bureaucracies.

The regulators and bureaucrats overseeing
hybrids and ﬁrms with government ownership stakes, for example, are on terrain as
unexplored by public administration scholars
as those they are supervising. Hybrid organizations are linked less formally to the federal
bureaucracy than traditional agencies; they are
often not in the budget, they are not staﬀed
by appointees, and they are exempt from
management laws (Koppell 2001). Regulatory
relationships are de facto substitutes for these
severed administrative ties (Koppell 2003).
Goals must be translated into speciﬁc requirements that can be applied without undermining the hybrid. If the regulation is too
onerous, the theoretical beneﬁts promised by the quasi-governmental structures may be lost. On the other hand, failure to adequately
regulate hybrid organizations can leave the public policy objectives
unreached thus undermining the underlying purpose. The regulator
has to balance conﬂicting goals—ﬁnancing housing for Americans
without threatening the ﬁscal health of the U.S. government, in this
case—with no obvious solution. Adapting regulation to this task has
proven a challenge, with the current Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
situation a dramatic illustration. Even with the companies facing ﬁscal disaster, Congress smacked the regulator (which it had chastised
for its weak oversight of the two ﬁrms) when it attempted to set
limits on size of the portfolio size, and increased the size of the loans
Fannie and Freddie could purchase (Shenn and Tyson 2008).

For students of public administration, such oversight follies beg the
question of bureaucratic ability to eﬀectively regulate the proliferating public–private hybrid organizations. Similarly, the now common collaboration between government agencies and nonproﬁts
should raise concern regarding bureaucratic capacity to manage such
programs (Selden, Sowa, and Sandfort 2006). The emergence of a
set of special companies—those ﬁnancial institutions that, through
scale or interconnectedness, are deemed “too big to fail”—raises the
stakes considerably. With investors and business partners conﬁdent
that the government will step in to make them whole no matter
what goes wrong, the emerging burden on ﬁnancial regulators will
dwarf those placed on GSE regulators. Government oﬃcials have
been given unprecedented responsibilities, including setting compensation levels for executives of publicly traded ﬁnancial institutions. If proposals now before Congress are adopted, government
bureaucrats will be put in a position to evaluate massive ﬁnancial
institutions and empowered to preemptively deconstruct them when
they pose a dire threat to the economy (Puzzanghera 2009). It is
worth noting here that in-depth analysis of the agencies that will be
on the spot—the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Oﬃce
of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and even the Federal Reserve—is surprisingly scarce in
the archival pages of this journal.
The proliferation of entities that span the public and private sectors thus has ﬁrst- and second-order eﬀects that ought to inﬂuence

Using Markets to Deliver Public Goods
Treating “market” as the opposite of “government” is just as limiting as
regarding “public” as government’s synonym. Although governments
obviously regulate markets and even participate in them as buyers and
sellers, historically public administration has treated government as
something outside the marketplace. In the canon of public administration, attention typically is focused on government programs and
institutions that produce and distribute goods and services through a
vertically organized bureaucracy. Similarly, regulatory responsibilities
are carried out with a “command and control” approach as government bureaucrats write rules and impose them on private actors. This
image is not accurate today—as the examples in the previous section
indicate—and it certainly will not be 10 years from now.
Some government participation in markets has received careful
attention from public administration scholars. Procurement, for
example, is a core subject, and it includes, by extension, some of the
most current topics, including the contracting out of government
services (e.g., Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2006; Frederickson
and Frederickson 2006). Other subjects inevitably touch on the government as a market participant. As an employer, for example, the
government is a major participant in labor markets, not just a regulator (e.g., Fernandez, Smith, and Wenger 2007). But the ﬁeld has not
followed as enthusiastically as public administration has entered the
market in at least three ways: ﬁrst, the increased reliance on marketoriented tools of government, like extension of insurance and guarantees; second, the transformation of regulation from a tool to curb
negative behavior into a substitute for traditional government service
provision; and third, the emphasis on market-based approaches to
regulation in particular substantive ﬁelds (e.g., climate change). Each
should be seen as fertile public administration research topics.
In 2020, public policy strategies incorporating market mechanisms
that are less familiar to students of bureaucracy are likely to be
most popular. The use of loan guarantees and government insurance, for example, represents an intelligent leveraging of the U.S.
government’s creditworthiness that does not strain the budget.
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Given the debt being accumulated at present, it seems safe to
assume that this will be a signiﬁcant virtue for the foreseeable future.
In a wide range of policy areas, including agriculture, housing,
trade, small business, energy, and international development, such
approaches are already well integrated into federal policy (Salamon
2002). They eﬀect change not by direct expenditure, but by altering
the incentives of private market participants.
This approach to public administration poses many distinctive questions that should be embraced. It reduces outlays but increases risk
rather than debt, for instance. But the federal government has not
demonstrated its competency as a risk manager, and, with trillions
of dollars in outstanding liability, we are already sitting on an explosive ﬁnancial powder keg. The chain reaction stemming from the
collapse of the subprime mortgage market gave vivid evidence of the
consequences of leverage gone awry. Yet the policy response—wise
or unwise—extended the government’s guarantee to some of the
most troubled institutions and thus dramatically increased exposure
of the public treasury. Congress has not seriously addressed the risk
management problem, and it will be hard-pressed to do so in the
future, for any comprehensive management of federal risk would
likely establish limits on the extension of federal guarantees. Public
administration scholars can push this issue to the forefront by making risk management a core topic in our ﬁeld (Hood, Rothstein, and
Baldwin 2001; Pollak 1996).
Instead of turning to mixed institutions, collaborative partnerships, or contractual relationships, governments often use creative
regulatory strategies to pursue public policy objectives in ways that
stretch our conception of regulation. The mandate of regulatory
bodies has been expanded to include the shaping of incentives for
private market participants to induce creation of public goods. This
moves away from a narrower idea of regulation as mechanism to
limit negative externalities. Shifting the burden of producing public
goods from government to private actors, this regulation might be
seen as inducing the creation of positive externalities.
One example that has received attention in recent years is the use
of the Community Reinvestment Act to steer capital into poorer
communities. The law sets requirements for ﬁnancial institutions
to serve “whole communities” and represents a response to the
problem of “redlining,” or the systematic avoidance of communities
by ﬁnancial institutions (Barr 2005). By setting a regulatory requirement, this law eﬀectively steers capital into areas where it is chronically undersupplied. Critics have charged that the implementation
of the Community Reinvestment Act, with insuﬃcient attention
to the reliance on unscrupulous loan originators, added fuel to the
subprime crisis (Pressman 2008).
This is precisely the type of challenge introduced by the movement
from one type of governance to another, and a reason why it should
be treated as a marked shift in public administration. Majone
(1997) calls it the substitution of regulatory governance for positive
governance. For regulatory bureaucracies, this represents a reordering of the goals and measures of success. In such circumstances,
regulatory bureaucracies depend on the regulated entities to thrive
in order to achieve policy objectives. Regulators must understand
the considerations driving the business calculations of ﬁrms in
targeted areas. Any rules must be calibrated to alter these calculi in
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such a way that behavior is modiﬁed without creating unintended
consequences. Current experience with incentives created for
ethanol production is a cautionary tale. Farmers switching to fuel
corn production from the growth of crops for human and feedstock
consumption is causing a rise in food prices (Ayre 2007). Did the
bureaucracy have the knowledge necessary to predict this outcome
and the ability to resist legislative will? This is a vital question for
our ﬁeld. Indeed, the historic health care legislation passed in March
2010 will require government bureaucrats to create insurance
exchanges whose smooth-functioning will be key to the success of
the new system.
As if these adaptations were not putting enough pressure on regulatory agencies, the place of traditional regulation in the arsenal of the
government is under attack. Market-based mechanisms are oﬀered
as a more preferable—and more politically feasible—approach to
vexing problems than conventional command and control arrangements. The cutting edge of this trend is emissions regulation.
The eﬀort to cap greenhouse gas emissions is now centered on
determining the appropriate approach. The command and control approach, after years of being pilloried, is being pushed aside
by market-based approaches and enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol
(Stavins 2003; Stavins, Keohane, and Revesz 1998; Woerdman
2004). So the answer is not to create requirements for more eﬃcient
smokestack scrubbers or lower-sulfur coal. Even a more traditional
market approach, a carbon tax, is widely scorned. The popular
solution, and the one adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives, is a cap and trade system. Trading in emissions permits places
the reduction decisions in the hands of ﬁrms, allowing them to
determine the most eﬃcient way to satisfy societal targets (Antes,
Hansjürgens, and Letmathe 2008). This logic has been extended
to land use, where grazing permits and mineral extraction rights
have been auctioned (so far on a pilot basis). This approach uses the
market to determine the “value” of the privilege to consume a public
good and even shifts political activism to the marketplace by giving
environmentalists an opportunity to purchase land-use privileges or
pollution permits.
These programs represent another type of regulatory governance.
The state retains some responsibility for establishing the rules of the
market. And the commodity being traded in many cases—permits,
credits, licenses—derives value by virtue of government programs
(Durant et al. 2004). But unlike programs that keep decisions
regarding allocation and preferred method in the hands of regulators, market programs shift as much discretion as possible to the
market participants. Again, public administration must embrace
such developments and see the decision-making processes of these
regulated ﬁrms as part of our ﬁeld rather than cede this terrain to
other disciplines. Doing so will leave critical elements—issues of
equity, process, and governance—out of the equation.
Transnational Governance
In almost every policy arena, the most severe public policy problems
are not conﬁned by political boundaries. Each day brings new stories
indicating the need for a deeper appreciation of the interaction
between phenomena experienced on opposite sides of the globe in
the realm of security, environmental protection, and public health. As
noted earlier, changes in fuel regulation on one continent are blamed

for the inﬂation of food prices and even stability-shattering riots on
the other side of the globe. Calamity in one ﬁnancial market spreads
almost instantaneously to others. Deadly diseases take advantage of
modern transportation to cross oceans in a matter of hours. Criminals
prey on victims from remote corners of the Earth using wild schemes
or devious software. The demand for raw materials in China’s burgeoning economy drives commodity prices higher and renders cost
estimates for municipal construction projects hopelessly low.
There is, of course, a substantial collection of international organizations devoted to addressing these problems. People are most familiar
with the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions (e.g.,
the International Monetary Fund, World Bank) but there are many
others, some aﬃliated with the United Nations and others not.
There are a host of regional organizations that work with or complement global eﬀorts. And, it is important to remember, there are
many nongovernmental bodies that play a vital role in addressing
transnational challenges. The development of such organizations
and their assumption of meaningful roles are accelerating. The
recent meetings of the G-20, for example, included a commitment
to better coordinate ﬁnancial regulation as a response to the lessons
learned from the ﬁnancial crisis (Financial Stability Board 2009).
Public administration as a ﬁeld has been slower than the bureaucracies we study to appreciate and devote attention to this new reality.
The pages of our journals feature limited discussion of the distinctive
administrative issues associated with transnational bureaucracies. This
is probably attributable to the way in which disciplinary lines are
drawn in political science and public administration. For the most
part, international organizations are the purview of the “international
relations” subﬁeld of political science. Many of the seminal scholars
looking at international organizations were interested in organizational design and administration; their work would be comfortable
alongside public administration research (Haas 1964; Jacobson 1979).
Alas, most contemporary research in this area is not as concerned with
administrative issues, and, for the most part, our ﬁeld remains focused
on institutions within a single jurisdiction—or perhaps comparisons
across a small number of such entities.

demands. Indeed, each organization—even those that are part of the
United Nations “system” of organizations—is truly distinctive.
In recent decades, the landscape of international organizations
has become more diverse as nongovernmental bodies and quasigovernmental bodies play an increasingly prominent role in global
governance. Standard-setting bodies such as the International Organization for Standardization or the International Electrotechincal
Commission originated as obscure industrial coordination bodies,
intended to ensure the interoperability of devices and mechanical parts. But the substantive footprint of these entities has grown
over the years to include management processes and even corporate
social responsibility. More specialized bodies such as the International Accounting Standards Board, a nonproﬁt organization based
in London, promulgate standards that are just as crucial in global
ﬁnancial regulation as those produced by the intergovernmental
Basel Committee on Capital Standards. From an administrative
perspective, these standard-setting bodies represent a signiﬁcant
departure from standard models of governmental rulemaking. In
general, the work of these entities is carried out by members—with
the staﬀ playing mostly a supporting role—who participate through
technical committees and working groups centered around substantive areas of concern. Naturally, this creates a dynamic entirely different from that associated with a typical Administrative Procedure
Act rulemaking exercise.
Even more intriguing, there has been a proliferation of nongovernmental standard-setting bodies with a clear social agenda driving
their work. The Forest Stewardship Council and the Marine Stewardship Council are perhaps the best known to American consumers. These organizations attempt to get market power behind their
standards, and, when successful, these can be every bit as compelling
as the rules set forth by intergovernmental organizations. Indeed,
one key ﬁnding of my recently completed study of international
rulemaking organizations was that the adherence dynamics—including rule adoption and enforcement—were not terribly diﬀerent for
government and nongovernment rule-makers (Koppell 2010).

If the mere existence of global rulemaking
bodies is not enough to attract the attention
Transnational governance has been with us for
of public administration scholars, the increaslonger than many may realize. The Universal
If the mere existence of
ing centrality of transnational rules in a wide
Postal Union and the International Telecomvarious global rulemaking
variety of policy arenas—from food safety to
munications Union (née Telegraph) were
bodies is not enough to
money laundering to Internet commerce—
created in the 1860s to facilitate smoother
attract the attention of public
ought to be. The emergence of a world
cross-border communication (Murphy 1994).
administration scholars,
government is not at hand, but the increasing
In the years since, many other international
the increasing centrality of
importance of global rulemaking bodies sugorganizations have been created to deal with
gests a future of meaningful public adminisissues requiring global coordination and
transnational rules in a wide
tration that transcends borders. And like the
harmonization. Traditionally, these have been
variety of policy arenas—
rise of quasi-governmental bodies domestiintergovernmental organizations with a basis
from food safety to moneycally, the emergence of global governance has
in treaties among states. The World Intellaundering to Internet
secondary eﬀects at home.
lectual Property Organization, for example,
commerce—ought to be.
has its origins in several nineteenth-century
The intertwining of American bureaucracy
treaties signed to protect copyrights and tradewith global governance organizations is a far
marks across borders. The International Civil
Aviation Organization arose to establish safety and communications less advanced phenomenon than the proliferation of public–private
hybrids or the incorporation of market mechanisms, but it is already
standards when transoceanic ﬂight became a part of everyday life.
an important fact of life in many policy areas (O’Toole and Hanf
Each of these organizations developed a bureaucracy, administrative
2002). Bodies such as the International Civil Aviation Organization,
procedures, and a rulemaking process suitable to a unique set of
Administration without Borders S51

the World Intellectual Property Organization, and, most famously,
the World Trade Organization make rules with serious ramiﬁcations
for American actors. In many cases, these rules can conﬂict with
American statutes and regulations, requiring adaptation on the part
of government agencies and ﬁrms. And contrary to the view that the
U.S. government is unbending in the face of international norms,
this accommodation of international rules occurs regularly (Chayes
and Chayes 1991).
More importantly, the American government is taking its participation in such international organizations more seriously than
has been the case historically (DaVaux 2000). For decades, the
International Organization for Standardization, which promulgates standards in a host of industrial areas, has been dominated
by Europeans, giving businesses from these countries a signiﬁcant
potential advantage. If global standards match European standards
(and not American), the size of the potential market accessible
to European ﬁrms without costly adaptation to local markets is
signiﬁcant (DaVaux 2000). So participation in the deliberations of
international bodies is a commonplace responsibility for American
bureaucrats.
Agencies now routinely devote staﬀ to international issues and
participate in global and regional transnational organizations. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for example, has an international
oﬃce. More importantly, the regulations produced by the commission make frequent reference to the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) regulations and the requirement that American
entities comply with IAEA standards and make themselves open
to IAEA inspections (NRC 2004). This type of recognition of the
primacy of international regulations is far from universal, but the
practices of many government bureaucracies reﬂect international
mandates from entities such as the World Customs Union, the Universal Postal Union, and the Convention on the Trade in International and Endangered Species.
The need for an integrated global ﬁnancial regulatory architecture
was highlighted by the crisis, but active support for transnational
rulemaking institutions in this policy area has been growing for
some time. The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering,
for example, has gained prominence as shutting oﬀ the ﬁnancial spigot has become a tool to stop terrorists (Ayres 2002). The
Securities and Exchange Commission and the nongovernmental
Financial Accounting Standards Board consult with the International Accounting Standards Board as it develops the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). It was announced recently
that companies listing in the United States need only prepare IFRS
accounting, thus saving them the expense of reporting their ﬁnancial data according to GAAP standards (SEC 2007).
By 2020, our ﬁeld should have embraced the international arena,
bringing attention from those serious about organization and
administration. At a minimum, educated public administrators must
be aware of and well versed in the dynamics of global governance.
More than any single addition to the research agenda, the most profound adaptation required is that we embrace a broader understanding of “public administration” to include all forms of governance
intended to serve public interests. This means moving beyond the
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equation of “public” with “government” and seeing administration
in the broadest possible light to capture all of the varied approaches
to governance (Frederickson 1997). Divorcing the idea of “publicness” from government can maintain the ﬁeld’s vitality without
rendering it hopelessly amorphous, as some have feared. In the most
straightforward formulation, to be a public organization is to be of
the government. Bozeman and Bretschneider (1994) reﬁned this
notion to recognize the reality that many organizations that are not
literally governmental (such as government contractors or some
nonproﬁts) are funded by governments or derive their authority
from governments, making them public as well. Others have looked
at the tools employed by an organization, the mechanisms used to
control the organization, or the expectations facing an organization as the relevant criteria to determine publicness (Antonsen and
Jorgensen 1997; Bozeman 1987, 2007; Pesch 2008). These conceptualizations of “public” would take in many of the developments
described in this essay. Still, these approaches do not disentangle
publicness from sector because the aspects of organizational design
that connote publicness ultimately trace back to government (Lan
and Rainey 1992; Perry and Rainey 1988).
To frame publicness as something distinct from governmentalness,
the quality of an organization’s function, its role in society, and the
impact of its activities must be captured (Bozeman and Bretschneider 1994, 219; Haque 2001). Ten years from now, we should
see “publicness” as a measure of the extent to which an organization
draws on, invokes, or aﬀects the common interests of all members
of a society (Haque 2001; Nutt and Backoﬀ 1993; Pesch 2008;
Wamsley and Zald 1976). We might capture publicness by looking for the pursuit of collective goods and an eﬀect on individuals’
public or civic interests.
• Collective goods: Organizations serving a common interest
should be regarded as more public (Haque 2001). Nondivisible
public goods are, in this sense, more public than individually
consumed goods. Thus, to illustrate with a rather extreme comparison, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees
is more public than the Coca-Cola Company, even though the
beverage maker serves a larger percentage of the world’s population. Organizations that pursue proﬁts for shareholders are less
public than those endeavoring to maintain collective goods such
as security. Similarly, control of a common good—by a private
or governmental organization—renders an organization more
public.
• Civic interests: Publicness is about more than collectivity.
Some individual considerations are highly public. State coercion
is public not only because it reﬂects government’s monopoly on
violence, but also because it deprives individuals of their rights of
citizenship. An organization is directly impinging on the “public” side of the individual (Benn and Gaus 1983). Organizations
can be diﬀerentiated on this basis. Those that aﬀect individuals’
purely private interests—say, their product choices—are less
public than those that aﬀect civic interests such as voting ability
or the right to purchase property.
Few have trouble seeing the work of governmental bodies as public
in character given these criteria. And government contractors
would still be seen as part of the public administration ﬁrmament
with publicness framed in this light. For example, private prison

operators, companies that have assumed increasing responsibility for
housing the nation’s inmates, are carrying out a collective function
and aﬀect the civic interests of inmates (e.g., Morris 1998). Similarly, Halliburton drew questions—and charges of malfeasance—
precisely because it was carrying out the administration of public
functions in Iraq (e.g., Gibbons 2004).

forms of public nonjurisdictional or nongovernmental policymaking
and implementation” (2005, 294). Indeed, this covers a substantial portion of the developments described in these pages. Much
research that comes under the governance heading, Frederickson
notes, complements the bread and butter of public administration,
the “day-to-day management of an agency or organization,” and
public administration could even be expanded to include “public
administration of governance,” the management of nongovernmental institutions and organizations” (Frederickson 2005, 300). This
starts to sound a lot like the expanded view of “public” proposed
above. From a disciplinary marketing perspective, an imperialistic
version of governance that includes both the day-to-day challenges
of administration and the transformation of states and governments
may be most attractive. This is perhaps broader than that which
Frederickson contemplates. In short, governance would include the
whole of public administration as we know it and then some!

But there are nongovernmental organizations that might not be seen
as falling within the purview of public administration that would
seem more public when considered in the proposed approach. The
Educational Testing Service, for example, is a New Jersey–based
nonproﬁt organization that creates and administers a range of
academic tests that are crucial to thousands of students seeking
admission to American universities every year. The exams are oﬀered
around the world and constitute a gateway to U.S. higher education. Thus, the role performed by this private entity is public in its
eﬀect and broad in scope. Unsurprisingly, this
organization has been criticized by teachers,
One can easily get caught up debating labels
One can easily get caught up
students, parents, and concerned interest
ad inﬁnitum. Whether we use “public admindebating labels ad inﬁnitum.
groups (Jackson 1986; Nordheimer and Franz
istration” or “governance” is less important
1997). It makes sense for public administrathan the boundaries we deﬁne for our ﬁeld
Whether we use “public
tion scholars in the education area to view the
and
the relationship of those boundaries to
administration” or “governance”
Educational Testing Service as a legitimate
the
world
in which we are interested. In its
is less important than the
subject of inquiry. There are other examples in
early days, public administration was the
boundaries we deﬁne for our
diﬀerent policy arenas—such as credit rating
heart of political science. Indeed, the two were
ﬁeld and the relationship of
agencies that are crucial element of ﬁnancial
essentially indistinguishable. In the years since,
those boundaries to the world
architecture or the standard-setting bodies dishowever, our ﬁeld has become increasingly discussed earlier—that might be more persuasive
connected from many of the big-picture quesin which we are interested.
to some (Sinclair 2005).
tions and seen as being narrowly concerned
with bureaucratic processes and the implementation of government
This is not oﬀered as a deﬁnitive approach, but rather to suggest a
programs. Indeed, we ought to take umbrage at the fact that many of
sense in which publicness can be separated from governmentalness
the giants of our ﬁeld who pushed beyond this deﬁnition—Herbert
to redeﬁne our disciplinary terrain. Others would undoubtedly
Simon, Chester Barnard, Mary Parker Follet, and Charles Lindblom,
improve on this primitive eﬀort. A conceptualization of publicness
to name few—are now labeled something other than scholars of
that moves beyond government is consistent with an understandpublic administration because they do not meet this overly restrictive
ing of “public administration” that captures varied approaches
expectation. This development may be an unintended consequence
to governance. Deﬁnitions of governance generally touch on the
of the rise of schools of public policy and public administration,
processes, systems, and structures (formal and informal) by which
which sapped public administration scholarship out of departments
behavior is regulated and constrained (Peters 1995). Our ﬁeld
of political science. Or it may lie much more deeply in an overly
should be concerned with organizations that are charged with creat- eager acceptance of Wilson’s politics–administration dichotomy. The
ing order in public spheres. As such, governance does not require
historical explanation, however, is a topic for a diﬀerent essay.
government involvement, although it certainly is very common,
and any organization engaged in governance would be, by deﬁniThe point here is to argue for a reassertion of a more expansive contion, “public” (Peters and Pierre 1998; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; ceptualization of public administration—one that is empirically and
Ruggie 2004).
historically grounded—that accommodates the varied forms and
approaches to the implementation of public policy. The enthusiasm
Broadening the view of “public” in such a way that it encompasses
with which many scholars have embraced the governance label
varied approaches to governance may seem like a backdoor means
speaks to our collective desire to break beyond the boundaries that
of access to the governance trend. Frederickson (2005) oﬀered an
have hardened around our ﬁeld. The contemporary developments
insightful critique of the faddish rise of “governance” in place of
sketched in this essay are oﬀered to force a confrontation with the
public administration. While expressing some frustration with the
artiﬁcial limitations that have been placed on public administraknee-jerk normative desirability of “governance,” which seemed to
tion. Like Truman Burbank struggling to get beyond the soundstage
amorphously encompass anything that was supposedly novel and
wall, we should pursue a broader conception of our ﬁeld (whether
good (e.g., New Public Management), he emphasized the value
it is called governance or something else) and eagerly revel in all the
of what “governance” does add to the agenda of public adminismessiness lying beyond the borders.
tration scholars. Governance takes in, according to Frederickson
“(1) vertical and horizontal interjurisdictional and interorganizaNote
tional cooperation; (2) extension of the state or jurisdiction by con1. Many so-called government corporations are, in many respects, indistinguishable
tracts or grants to third parties, including subgovernments; and (3)
from agencies. They are on budget, receive appropriated dollars, and are staﬀed
Administration without Borders S53

by presidential appointees and civil servants. Indeed, the deﬁnition of what
constitutes a government corporation is so ambiguous that a General Accounting
Oﬃce study of such organizations (1995) relied on entities to determine whether
they were, in fact, government corporations.
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